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JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
This Petition for Review by Appellant, Linda Hymas. is from a final order of the 
Labor Commission of Utah date July 31, 2007.! This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal 
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §§ 34A-2-801(8)(a). 63-46b-16, and 78-2a-3(2)(a) (2006). 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Issue: Did the Commission act reasonably and rationally in denying death benefits 
to Ms. Hymas on the basis that she failed to establish that her husband's death is medically 
related to his work activities with SOS Staffing. This issue was preserved at R. 23-26. 
Standard of Review 
Whether the Commission erroneously applied the Allen test is a mixed question of 
law and fact reviewed for reasonableness and rationality. See Acosta v. Labor Comm'n, 
2002 UT App 67, PI 1 (Utah Ct. App. 2002); AE Cle\ ite. Inc. v. Labor Comm'n. 2000 UT 
App 35, P7, 996 P.2d 1072 HN6 ("The Legislature has granted the Commission discretion 
to determine the facts and apply the law to the facts" and this court will uphold the 
Commission's determination unless it "exceeds the bounds of reasonableness and 
rationality."). 
1
 Ms. Hymas's brief indicates she is appealing from the ALJ's Order. However, given 
that there was further appeal to the Commissioner, it would seem that her appeal is from the 
later order of Sherri HayashL the Commissioner, dated July 31, 2007, affirming the ALLs 
Findings of Fact Conclusions of Law and Order. 
1 
DETERMINATIVE LAW 
The determinative law is Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-401 (Utah "Workers 
Compensation Act"), the provision authorizing workers' compensation for industrial 
accidents. This section reads as follows: 
An employee described in Section 34A-2-104 who is injured 
and the dependents of each such employee who is killed by 
accident arising out of and in the course of the employee's 
employment, wherever such injury occurred, if the accident 
was not purposely self-inflicted, shall be paid . . . 
compensation for loss sustained on account of the injury or 
death . . . such amount for medical, nurse, and hospital 
services . . . [and] medicines; and in the case of death, the 
amount of funeral expenses. 
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-401 (2006). 
The section emphasized above was interpreted by the Utah Supreme Court in 
Allen v. Industrial Commission. 729 P.2d 15. 18. 22-23 (Utah 1986). to require a claimant 
to prove both medical and legal causation. 
z, 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case and Course of the Proceedings 
This case presents the question whether the spouse of an employee of SOS 
Staffing/Hyclone is entitled to death benefits as a result of the death of her husband, 
William Hymas that coincidentally occurred while working for this employer. 
On April 12, 2006 Linda Lee Hymas (hereinafter "Ms. Hymas") filed an 
Application for Hearing requesting death benefits in connection with the death of her 
husband, William Hymas (hereinafter "Mr. Hymas") who had a fatal heart attack on 
February 1, 2006 while working for SOS Staffing. Ms. Hymas alleged that the stress of 
physical labor Mr. Hymas performed on his job caused or contributed to his heart attack. 
(R. 1-18). 
On May 26, 2006 SOS Staffing/Hyclone and the Insurance Company of the State 
of Pennsylvania (collectively wwSOS Staffing"), its worker's compensation insurance 
carrier, filed an Answer defending on the grounds that Ms. Hymas fails to show either a 
legal or medical causal connection between MR. Hymas' work activities and his heart 
attack. (R. 23-26). 
A hearing was held on October 25, 2006 before Administrative Law Judge, Deidre 
Marlowe. Judge Marlowe admitted the Medical Records Exhibit into evidence. (R. 106-
107). 
3 
On October 26, 2006, the ALJ entered her Findings of Fact Conclusions of Law 
and Order denying benefits. The ALJ held that Ms. Hymas failed to establish a medical 
causal relation between Mr. Hymas" death and his work at SOS Staffing on February 1, 
2006. (R. 36-39). 
On November 22, 2006 Ms. Hymas filed a Motion for Review of the ALJ"s Order. 
(R. 40-59). 
On December 12, 2006 SOS Staffing filed a Response to the Motion for Review. 
(R. 60-66). 
On July 31, 2007, the Commission entered is Order Affirming ALJ's Decision. 
(R. 68-71). 
On August 14, 2007 Ms. Hymas filed a Request for Reconsideration. (R. 72-73). 
On September 26, 2007 the Commission entered an Order Denying Request for 
Reconsideration. (R. 101-103). 
On October 26, 2007 Ms. Hymas filed a Petition for Review seeking review from 
the final order of the Labor Commission. 
A Docketing Statement was filed thereafter. 
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Statement of Facts 
1. Decedent, Mr. Hymas, worked for SOS Staffing through its client company, 
Hyclone. (R. 1). 
2. On February 1, 2006, Mr. Hymas was found on the ground at the Hyclone facility. 
Medical records indicate that he was found in cardiac arrest. Revival efforts were 
not successful. (R. 106). 
3. Because Mr. Hymas' death was unexpected and unwitnessed, emergency room 
personnel involved the medical examiner. (R. 106, 3A, 4). 
4. The medical examiner found the cause of death to be 1) occlusive coronary artery 
disease involving a) right coronary artery, 60% occlusion, b) ostia or right 
coronary artery, partial occlusion by plaque and, c) left anterior coronary artery, 
greater than 90% occlusion; and, 2) atrial septal defect. (R. 106, 2). 
5. The medical examiner went on to write in a letter of October 11, 2006 stating that 
work-related stress may be a factor in increasing the demands on a person's heart. 
However, the examiner did not state any opinion as to whether Mr. Hymas's work 
activities caused or contributed to his heart attack. That letter provides: 
Atherosclerolos has several risk factors that may enhance the rate at 
which the disease process develops. These include male gender, aging, a 
family history of heart disease, hypertension, smoking, poor exercise and 
eating habits, diabetes and smoking. The medical history7 provided was that 
Mr. Hymas was a non-insulin dependent diabetic. 
The effects of work related stress may be a factor in an additional work load 
being placed upon the heart, depending upon a person's adaptation to the 
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stress. Signs of anxiety may be displayed. Physiologic manifestations may 
include high blood pressure or an increased heart rate. These latter events 
may increase the work load on the heart compounding the underlying 
atherosclerotic disease risk to the heart. Additional physical requirements in 
the workplace may also place additional demands of the heart. 
I have no information regarding the etiology or degree of stress, if any, that 
the deceased was subjected to during the course of his employment. That 
information, no matter how detailed, would not alter my conclusion and 
certification as to the cause and manner of death of this individual. (R., 106 
at 3A). 
6. A hearing on this matter was held on October 25, 2006. At that hearing, Ms. 
Hymas sought death benefits based upon Mr. 1 lymas's fatal heart attack that 
coincidentally occurred at the Hyclone facility. (R., 107). 
7. At the hearing the ALJ asked if the medical record exhibit was complete. Ms. 
Hymas attorney responded that it was. (R. 107). Based upon the record, Judge 
Marlowe ruled from the bench that the medical records submitted by Ms. Hymas 
did not meet the appropriate medical causation standard showing that Mr. Hymas"s 
heart attack and subsequent death was medically caused or contributed by any 
work accident or disease. (R. 36-39). 
8. Ms. Hymas asked that she and her deceased husband's co-workers be allowed to 
testify regarding the medical causal connection between his work and death. Since 
Ms. Hymas failed in her initial burden of medical causation, the ALJ refused to 
entertain any hearing testimony. (R. 107). 
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9. Ms. Hymas then requested a continuance to submit additional medical evidence of 
medical causation. Judge Marlowe denied this request for continuance. (R. 107). 
10. The ALJ issued her written Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order on 
October 25, 2006 reiterating her ruling at hearing. (R. 36-39). 
11. Ms. Hymas then filed a Motion for Review of this Order. The Commission agreed 
that because Ms. Hymas did not establish a medical causal connection between her 
husband's death and his work at SOS Staffing, she failed to meet her burden under 
Utah Code Ann. 34A-2-401 of the Utah Worker's Compensation Act. (R. 40-59). 
12. Ms. Hymas has since filed a Petition for Review with the Utah Court of Appeals. 
Attached to her Brief are documents, including two medical treatises, that were not 
made part of the record below. 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
There was no error by the Commission in denying Ms. Hymas' claim for 
dependency death benefits as a result of the death of her husband. Ms. Hymas failed to 
establish, as is her burden, that Mr. Hymas' death was medically caused by stress, strain 
or exertion from his work with SOS Staffing. Since she failed to establish this prima facie 
burden, there was no need for the ALJ to evaluate the other elements necessary to 
establish compensability. It also was not error for the ALJ to refuse to allow hearing 
testimony of lay witnesses as these witnesses were not qualified to provide a medical 
opinion regarding the cause of Mr. Hymas' death. 
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ARGUMENT2 
POINT 1: THERE WAS NO ERROR BY THE COMMISSION IN DENYING 
DEATH BENEFITS SINCE MS. HYMAS FAILED TO MEET HER 
BURDEN OF ESTABLISHING MEDICAL CAUSATION. 
Ms. Hymas presents a plethora of arguments challenging the ALJ and 
Commission's ultimate ruling denying her benefits as a result of her husband's death 
under the Utah Worker's Compensation Act. She argues that the ALJ erred in (1) 
overlooking whether Mr. Hymas sustained an "accident"3; (2) presuming the existence of 
a pre-existing heart condition; (3) ignoring the issue of legal causation; (4) failing to remit 
this case to a medical panel; and, (5) refusing to allow Ms. Hymas to present witness 
testimony. Such arguments all lack legal merit. 
Quite simply, Ms. Hymas' arguments each lack substantive merit since there was 
insufficient evidence submitted by Ms. Hymas to meet her burden of medical causation. 
Since this initial element was not established, the ALJ was not required to examine other 
statutory elements. See Lancaster v. Gilbert Development 736 P.2d 237 (Utah 1987) 
2
 Petitioner's first argument entitled "appellate review"' does not provide any legal 
challenge to the Commission's Order Denying Motion for Review. Accordingly, 
Respondents have not addressed that argument given Ms. Hymas' improper briefing. 
3
 In any event, there is no dispute that Mr. Hymas did die by "accident'" as his heart 
attack w7as certainly an unexpected or unintended event that resulted in his death. See Allen 
v. Industrial Comm'n infra; Price River Coal v. Industrial Comm'n, 731 P.2d 1079 (Utah 
1986). However, such a finding does not complete the analysis since the more difficult 
question in this case was whether the claimant's death arose out of and in the course of 
employment under the medical causation standard. 
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(when court's ruling turns on issue of medical causation, other elements including legal 
causation need not be examined by court). 
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-401 (Utah "Workers Compensation Act"), the provision 
authorizing workers' compensation for industrial accidents provides as follows: 
An employee described in Section 34A-2-104 who is injured and the 
dependents of each such employee who is killed by accident arising out of 
and in the course of the employee's employment, wherever such injury 
occurred, if the accident was not purposely self-inflicted, shall be paid . . . 
compensation for loss sustained on account of the injury or death . . . such 
amount for medical, nurse, and hospital services . . . [and] medicines; and in 
the case of death, the amount of funeral expenses. 
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-401 (2006). This section has been interpreted by the Utah 
Supreme Court in Allen v. Industrial Commission, 729 P.2d 15, 18, 22-23 (Utah 1986), to 
require a claimant to prove that he sustained an "accident", as well as establish medical 
and legal causation. 
In Allen and its progeny, the Utah's Supreme Court has indicated that to 
demonstrate "medical causation" a Petitioner "must introduce evidence establishing that 
the stress, strain or exertion required by his or her occupation led to the resulting 
disability." id. at 27. The court in Olsen v. Industrial Commission , 776 p.2d 937 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1989) evaluated whether a claimant had established that his heart attacks were 
related to his work duties. The Utah Court of Appeals found that there was competent 
comprehensive medical evidence upon which the Commission could rely in concluding 
that Petitioner's heart attacks were not medically rela1 ;d to his employment activities. 
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Likewise the court ruled in Landcaster that because there was insufficient medical 
evidence from a physician, stating with medical certainty that the claimant's heart attack 
was caused by work related factors, benefits were properly denied. 
Ms. Hymas fails to recognize that because she failed to meet her initial burden of 
proving medical causation, there was no need to go forward with evaluating whether an 
"accident" occurred or whether legal causation was established. Moreover, no medical 
panel was warranted in this case since medical panels are only used when there are 
conflicting medical reports. See Utah Admin. Code R. 602-2-2; Roberts v. Labor 
Comm'n. 2006 UT App 403 (Utah Ct. App. 2006) ("[RJeferral to a medical panel is 
mandatory only where there is a medical controversy as evidenced through conflicting 
medical reports."). Such a medical controversy did not exist in this case. 
The Commission properly recognized that Ms. Hymas failed to meet her burden of 
establishing a medical causal connection between her husband's death and his work. The 
Commission also recognized that testimony of certain witnesses may be relevant to other 
aspects of her claim, such as legal causation. However, the Commission correctly ruled 
that lay testimony is not competent to prove medical causation. Indeed, when the cause of 
death is related to an internal anatomy, medical evidence of causation is required. See 
Griffith v. Industrial ComrrTn, 399 P.2d 204, 206 (Utah 1965); Harlan v. Industrial 
Comm'n. 15 Utah 2d 298. 391 P.2d 838 (1964); Cooper v. Industrial Comm'n. 15 Utah 2d 
91, 387 P.2d 689 (1963). Ms. Hymas' attempt to submit testimony of non-expert 
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witnesses, including herself and her husband's co-workers, does not qualify as 
"competent'* medical testimony. Hence the Commission correctly rejected the 
presentation of such evidence. 
Additionally, Ms. Hymas asserts that, under the Act, all doubts must be resolved in 
favor of compensation. In doing so, Ms. Hymas attempts to shift the burden of proof to 
SOS, but to no avail. It is well settled that a claimant bears the burden of proof to 
establish the right to compensation. See Owens v. Labor Comm'n, 2004 UT App 352 
(Utah Ct. App. 2004). To be entitled to benefits under the Act, a claimant must show, "by 
a preponderance of evidence, that a workplace accident occurred and that the accident 
was the legal and medical cause of the injury". McKesson Corp. v. Labor Comm'n, 2002 
UT App 10, P 15, 41 P.3d 468. The requirement to e^iablish medical causation Mensure[s] 
that there is a medically demonstrable causal link between the work-related exertions" 
and the injuries claimed. Allen v. Industrial Comm'n, 729 P.2d 15, 27 (Utah 1986). If the 
claimant cannot show a medical causal connection, compensation should be denied. Ms. 
Hymas failed to establish that the 2006 fatality at the work place was the medically 
caused by Mr. Hymas" work. The liberal construction of the Act does not relieve her of 
her burden. 
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POINT 2: THE COMMISSION DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING TO ALLOW 
POST-HEARING EVIDENCE. 
Ms. Hymas also argues that the Commission erred in refusing to allow her a 
continuance to collect and present additional medical evidence. We disagree. The 
Commission did not err in refusing to allow Ms. Hymas to present post- hearing evidence 
to establish medical causation. The court correctly ruled that Utah Administrative Code 
Rule 602-2-IF.6. requires parties to "diligently pursue" evidence so as to avoid delaying 
the adjudicative process. Likewise the Commission's Rule 602-2-l(I)(7) states that on 
the date of the hearing "[pjarties are expected to be prepared." Requests for 
continuances and reopening of cases may be granted at the discretion of the ALJ for good 
cause shown. However, the Commission correctly found that lack of preparation for a 
hearing shall not constitute good cause. 
Ms. Hymas had more than six months between the time she filed her Application 
for Hearing and the date of the hearing to obtain medical evidence that would support her 
allegation that Mr. Hymas's death was medically caused by his work at SOS Staffing. 
Nevertheless, she did not submit the necessary medical evidence at the hearing. Ms. 
Hymas certainly had a reasonable opportunity to present medical evidence to establish a 
medical causal connection between Mr. Hymas" death and his work. A continuance to 
allow for additional "medical research" should not be allowed due to her failure to 
diligently investigate this matter. 
13 
POINT 3: THIS COURT SHOULD STRIKE EXHIBITS ATTACHED TO MS. 
HYMAS" APPELLATE BRIEF 
Ms. Hymas attaches several documents to her Appellate Brief. The first is a letter 
of the Office of Medical Examiner. The second is a treatise from the New England 
Journal of Medicine. The third is a treatise from the American Medical Association. SOS 
asks the Court to strike these attachments as they were not made part of the evidentiary 
record below. Indeed, to attach such records and have the Court of Appeals now rely on 
them would violate SOS's right to due process. 
While formal rules of evidence do no apply in administrative proceedings held 
before the Utah Labor Commission, Utah law allows parties of notice of proceedings and 
opportunity to present testimony and cross examine v "tnesses and meet such evidence as 
is presented at the proceeding. Utah's courts have held: 
it is fundamental that in investigations such as the Industrial Commission is 
authorized to make, any party to a cause or proceeding is entitled to be 
advised of and afforded an opportunity to meet such evidence as the 
commission may consider and rely on in the making of its findings and 
decision. Unless such evidence is brought into the case, and in some lawful 
manner made a part of the record, it cannot be regarded as competent 
evidence, and must be excluded in determining the sufficiency of the 
evidence to support the findings of the Industrial Commission. 
Workers' Compensation Fund v. Industrial Comm'n, 761 P.2d 572, 575 (Utah Ct. App. 
1988) citing Tintic Standard Mining Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 100 Utah 96, 110 P.2d 
367, 369 (1941) ("the commission should not receive evidence on disputed matters where 
a hearing is held after the hearing is closed, since then a party adversely affected would 
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have no opportunity to meet such evidence . . . ."). In the Workers Compensation Fund, 
the Court held that it was error for the Commission to rely on medical commentary which 
was not introduced at the evidentiary hearing and was not made part of the record. 
Petitioner attempts to support her argument that a medical causal connection exists 
between the claimed industrial accident and her husband's work based upon these 
medical treatises. However, since these documents were not introduced at the evidentiary 
hearing and made part of the record, it is improper at this late juncture to allow such 
evidence into the record. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court of Appeals should affirm the Commission's Order Affirming ALJ's 
Decision. Ms. Hymas has not met her burden to establish the necessary elements of 
compensability. 
ADDENDUM 
1. Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order of Administrative Law 
Judge, dated October 25. 2006 Attachment A 
2. Order Affirming ALLs Decision, dated July 31. 2007 Attachment B 
15 
Respectfully submitted this day of August, 2008. 
BLACKBURN & STOLL. LC 
Mark 6 . Dean 
Kristy L. Bertelsen 
Attorneys for Appellees Attorneys for Appellees 
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Linda Lee Hymas filed an application for hearing on April 12, 2006 requesting 
appropriate benefits in connection with the death of her husband, William Hymas, who had a 
fatal heart attack on February 1, 2006 while working for SOS Staffing. The Petitioner alleged 
that the stress of the physical labor Mr. Hymas performed on his job caused or contributed to his 
heart attack. 
SOS Staffing and Insurance Co. of the State of Pennsylvania filed an answer on May 26, 
2006 defending on the grounds that the Petitioner fails to show either a legal or medical causal 
connection between Mr. Hymas' work activities and his heart attack. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
A hearing was held today and the medical records were marked as Exhibit A and 
admitted into evidence. The records relate that Mr. Hymas was found on the ground by co-
workers in an open area of the warehouse. He was found to be in cardiac arrest and the 
paramedics were called but attempts to revive him were unsuccessful. Because Mr. Hymas' 
death was unexpected and unwitnessed, emergency room personnel involved the medical 
examiner. ME p. 4. 
The medical examiner, Dr. Edward Leis, found the cause of death to be 1) occlusive 
coronary artery disease involving a) right coronary artery, 60% occlusion, b) ostia or right 
coronary artery, partial occlusion by plaque, and c) left anterior descending coronary artery, 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Linda Lee Hymas, Case No. 06-0370 
Page 2 
greater than 90% occlusion; and 2) atrial septal defect, small. In another letter dated October 11, 
2006 Dr. Leis affirms these conclusions. He also writes: 
Atherosclerosis has several risk factors that may enhance the rate at which 
the disease process develops. These include male gender, aging, a family history 
of heart disease, hypertension, smoking, poor exercise and eating habits, diabetes, 
and smoking. The medical history provided was that Mr. Hymas was a non-
insulin dependent diabetic. 
The effects of work-related stress may be a factor in an additional work 
load being placed upon the heart, depending upon a person's adaptation to that 
stress. Signs of anxiety may be displayed. Physiologic manifestations may 
include high blood pressure or an increased heart rate. These latter events may 
increase the workload on the heart compounding the underlying atherosclerotic 
disease risk to the heart. Additional physical requirements in the workplace may 
also place additional demands of the heart. 
I have no information regarding the etiology or degree of stress, if any, 
that the deceased was subjected to during the course of his employment. That 
information, no matter how detailed, would not alter my conclusion and 
certification as to the cause and manner of death of this individual. ME p. 3 A. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
The Petitioner must show that any conditions for which she claims benefits are medically 
causally related to an industrial injury. "Under the medical cause test, the claimant must show . . 
. that the stress, strain or exertion required by his or her occupation led to the resulting injury or 
disability." Allen v. Industrial Commission, 729 P.2d 15, 27 (Utah 1986). The burden of proof 
is on the Petitioner. 
In Lancaster v. Gilbert Development, 736 P.2d 237, 239-241 (Utah 1987), Mr. Lancaster 
sought benefits for a heart attack he suffered while working. He claimed that the cold weather 
and high altitude caused or contributed to his heart attack. His doctor opined that the altitude, 
cold, and working conditions "probably" precipitated the heart attack. However, the doctor also 
discussed Mr. Lancaster's various risk factors for coronary disease and eventually indicated that 
it was unlikely that cold exposure and exertion had much of a role in bringing on the heart attack. 
The Court ultimately viewed the doctor's opinion as inconclusive regarding the causal 
connection between the work conditions and the myocardial infarctions and therefore determined 
that Mr. Lancaster did not prove that there was a medical causal link between his work activities 
and his heart attack. 
In the present case, there is no medical opinion or other medical evidence to show that 
Mr. Hymas' work activities caused or contributed to his heart attack. At most, there is Dr. Leis' 
letter indicating that work-related stress may be a factor in increasing demands on a person's 
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heart. However, Dr. Leis' letter is far short of an opinion that any work activities which may 
have been performed by Mr. Hymas caused or contributed to his heart attack. Therefore the 
element of medical causation is not shown and the claim for benefits will be dismissed with 
prejudice. 
ORDER 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the application for hearing filed by Linda Lee Hymas on 
April 12, 2006 is dismissed with prejudice. 
DATED this ^ > day of October 2006. 
Deidre Marlowe 
Administrative Law Judge 
NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 
A party aggrieved by the decision may file a Motion for Review with the Adjudication 
Division of the Utah Labor Commission. The Motion for Review must set forth the specific 
basis for review and must be received by the Commission within 30 days from the date this 
decision is signed. Other parties may then submit their responses to the Motion for Review 
within 20 days of the date of the Motion for Review. 
Any party may request that the Appeals Board of the Utah Labor Commission conduct 
the foregoing review. Such request must be included in the party's Motion for Review or its 
response. If none of the parties specifically request review by the Appeals Board, the review will 
be conducted by the Utah Labor Commission. 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the attached Findings of Fact, Conclusions 
of Law, and Order, was mailed by prepaid U.S. postage on this ol£p day of October 2006, to the 
persons/parties at the following addresses: 
Linda Hymas 
330 E. 1200 N. 
Logan, UT 84341 
Raymond N. Malouf 
Malouf Law Offices 
150E.200N. Ste.D 
Logan, UT 84321-4036 
Mark D. Dean 
Blackburn & Stoll 
257 E. 200 S. Ste. 800 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 -2048 
UTAH LABOR COMMISSION 
Addendum B 
UTAH LABOR COMMISSION 
LINDA LEE HYMAS, surviving spouse 
Of WILLIAM E. HYMAS, deceased 
Petitioner, 
vs. j 
SOS STAFFING and INSURANCE CO. 
OF THE STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA, 
Respondents. 
! ORDER AFFIRMING 
ALJ'S DECISION 
Case No. 06-0370 
Linda Lee Hymas, surviving spouse of William E. Hymas, requests Commission review of 
Administrative Law Judge Marlowe's denial of Mrs. Hymas's claim for dependents' benefits under 
Utah Workers' Compensation Act ("the Act"; Title 34A, Chapter 2, Utah Code Annotated). 
The Commission exercises jurisdiction over this motion for review pursuant to Utah Code 
Annotated § 63-46M2 and § 34A-2-801(3) 
BACKGROUND AND ISSUE PRESENTED 
Mrs. Hymas claims workers' compensation dependents' benefits for her husband's death, 
which Mrs. Hymas alleged was caused by his work for SOS Staffing. Judge Marlowe held an 
evidentiary hearing in this matter and then denied Mrs. Hymas's claim for lack of evidence that Mr. 
Hymas's work was the medical cause of his death. 
In requesting Commission review of Judge Marlowe's decision, Mrs. Hymas argues that 
Judge Marlowe should have allowed Mrs. Hymas and other non-medical witnesses to testify at the 
evidentiary hearing regarding the medical cause of Mr. Hymas's death, and should have continued 
the hearing to allow Mrs. Hymas to obtain evidence of medical causation. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
The Commission adopts Judge Marlowe's findings of fact. As material to the issues raised 
by Mrs. Hymas's motion for review, the facts can be summarized as follows. 
On February 1, 2006, Mr. Hymas suffered a fatal heart attack while employed by SOS 
Staffing and working on assignment at Hyclone. Mr. Hymas's heart attack and death were caused by 
occlusive coronary artery disease. 
When Ms. Hymas filed her claim for dependents' benefits, she signed a release authorizing 
SOS Staffing to obtain Mr. Hymas's medical records. Although SOS Staffing then requested Mr. 
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Hymas's medical records from his medical providers, it did not receive all the requested records. 
The records that were received were included in the parties' joint medical exhibit, which was 
submitted to Judge Marlowe on October 11,2006, two weeks in advance of the evidentiary hearing. 
At the evidentiary hearing, Judge Marlowe asked if the medical record was complete. Mrs. 
Hymas's attorney responded that it was. Based on that record, JudgeMarlowe ruled from the bench 
that no medical evidence had been submitted to establish that Mr. Hymas's work was the medical 
cause of his heart attack and death. Mrs. Hymas then asked that she and her deceased husband's co-
workers be allowed to testify regarding the medical causal connection between Mr. Hymas's work 
and his death. Judge Marlowe declined to accept this testimony because the proposed witnesses 
were not qualified to render an opinion on that medical question. Mrs. Hymas then requested a 
continuance to submit additional evidence of medical causation. Judge Marlowe denied this request 
for continuance. After the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing, Judge Marlowe issued her decision 
denying Mrs. Hymas's claim for failure to prove medical causation. 
DISCUSSION 
Section 34A-2-401 of the Utah Workers' Compensation Act requires employers to pay 
workers' compensation benefits to employees injured by accidents "arising out of and in the course 
o f employment. Only work-related injuries are compensable under the Act, and injuries are not 
work-related unless, among other elements, the work is the "medical" cause of the injury. Allen v. 
Industrial Commission, 729 P.2d 115 (Utah 1986). In this case, the fundamental question is whether 
Mr. Hymas's work for SOS Staffing medically caused or contributed to his death. 
Mrs. Hymas has not submitted any medical evidence to establish a medical causal connection 
between her husband's work and his death. However, at the evidentiary hearing, she attempted to 
meet her burden of proof on this point with testimony from non-medical witnesses regarding the 
strenuous nature of Mr. Hymas's work duties. The Commission recognizes that this testimony might 
be relevant to other aspects of Mrs. Hymas's claim, such as the issue of legal causation. But lay 
testimony is not competent to prove medical causation—when the cause of death is related to internal 
anatomy, medical evidence of causation is required. Griffith v. Industrial Comm.
 r399 P.2d 204,206 
(Utah 1965). Because Mrs. Hymas's witnesses were not qualified to testify as to the medical cause 
of Mr. Hymas's death, Judge Marlow did not err in rejecting their testimony. 
Mrs. Hymas also argues that Judge Marlowe should have continued the evidentiary hearing to 
allow Mrs. Hymas to obtain and submit other evidence of medical causation. Under the 
Commission's administrative rule R602-2-1 .F.6, parties are expected to "diligently pursue" evidence 
so as to avoid delaying adjudicative proceedings. Likewise, the Commission's rule R602-2-1.I.7 
states that on the date set for hearing, "[pjarties are expected to be prepared. Requests for 
continuances may be granted at the discretion of the administrative law judge for good cause shown. 
Lack of diligence in preparing for the hearing shall not constitute good cause for a continuance." 
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In this case, Mrs. Hymas had more than six months between the time she filed her claim and 
the date of hearing to obtain medical evidence that would support her allegation that Mr. Hymas's 
death was medically caused by his work at SOS Staffing. Nevertheless, she did not submit the 
necessary medical evidence at the hearing, or explain why it was not possible to obtain such 
evidence. 
Mrs. Hymas argues that SOS Staffing failed in its duty to include relevant records from Mr. 
Hymas's medical providers as part of the joint medical exhibit. However, if Mrs. Hymas believed 
the missing records were relevant, it was her responsibility to ensure that they were included in the 
medical exhibit. Additionally, when Judge Marlow asked if there were any additional medical 
documents that should be included in the record, Mrs. Hymas's attorney replied that there were not. 
Mrs. Hymas has now submitted the "missing" records as part of her motion for review. The 
Commission has examined these records, but finds nothing therein that would establish Mr. Hymas's 
work as the medical cause of his heart attack and death. The Commission therefore finds that, even 
now, Mrs. Hymas has not proffered competent evidence of medical causation. 
Finally, Mrs. Hymas argues that Judge Marlowe should have continued the evidentiary 
hearing because SOS Staffing did not deliver the joint medical exhibit to Mrs. Hymas's attorney 10 
business days prior to the hearing, as required by Commission rule. According to this argument, if 
the medical exhibit had been provided earlier, she would have known that some medical records 
were missing. However, as already noted, the "missing" records in question do not establish medical 
causation and would not have prevented denial of Mrs. Hymas's claim. Under these circumstances, 
the Commission finds no reason to reopen the evidentiary hearing in this matter. 
In summary, Mrs. Hymas had a reasonable opportunity to present medical evidence to 
establish a medical causal connection between Mr. Hymas's work and his death. Because she has 
not submitted such evidence, the Commission concurs with Judge Marlowe's denial of Mrs. 
Hymas's claim for dependents' benefits. 
ORDER 
The Commission hereby Judge Marlowe's decision. It is so ordered 
Dated this ^ f day of July, 2007. 
Sherrie<Hayashi 
Utah Labor Commissioner 
IMPORTANT! NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS FOLLOWS ON NEXT PAGE. 
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NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 
Any party may ask the Labor Commission to reconsider this Order. Any such request for 
reconsideration must be received by the Labor Commission within 20 days of the date of this order. 
Alternatively, any party may appeal this order to the Utah Court of Appeals by filing a petition for 
review with the court. Any such petition for review must be received by the court within 30 days of 
the date of this order. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that a copy of the foregoing Order Affirming ALJ's Decision in the matter of Linda 
Lee Hymas, Case No. 06-0370, was mailed first class postage prepaid thisf^/S^day of July, 2007, to 
the following: 
Linda Lee Hymas 
330E 1200N 
Logan UT 84321 
SOS Staffing 
127 E l 100 N 
Logan UT 84341 
Insurance Co of the State of Pennsylvania 
Designated Agent 
OneConnellDr IstFl 
Berkeley Heights NJ 07922 
Raymond Malouf, Esq. 
150E200NSteD 
Logan UT 84321 
Mark D. Dean, Esq 
257 E 200 S Ste 800 
Salt Lake City UT 84111 
Sari Danielson \ 
Utah Labor Commission 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that true and correct copies of the foregoing document were mailed, first 
class, postage prepaid on the __^_"day of August, 2008, to: 
Utah Court of Appeals (8 copies, one w/ original signature) 
Scott M. Matheson Courthouse 
450 South State Street 
P.O.Box 140230 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0230 
Alan L. Hennebold, General Counsel (2 copies) 
Labor Commission of Utah 
160 East 300 South 
P.O. Box 1466 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-6615 
Marlin Grant (2 copies) 
Olson & Hogan 
130 South Main, Suite 200 
P.O. Box 525 
Logan, UT 84323-0525 
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